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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant fails to adequately address the issues that actually govern this appeal.
For example, Defendant offers very little argument to show that Salt Lake City's decision to design the Facility with a narrow sidewalk and with no safety restraint along
the edge of the concrete pit is covered by the discretionary function exception. And
Defendant hardly even tries to argue that the discretionary function exception covers
the City's failure to widen the sidewalk or install a safety restraint after the Facility
opened. Instead, Defendant avoids the issue and argues that because the design in
general is supposedly a discretionary function, all aspects of that design are inherently
discretionary. Utah law, however, does not allow such a per se analysis; instead, the
discretionary function analysis must focus on the specific acts and decisions at issue.
Similarly, Defendant misses the point in responding to Mr. Sandberg's argument
that the Utah Constitution's Open Courts provision would have been violated if his
claim against the City were barred. Defendant claims that the Utah Supreme Court's
recent decision in Lanev v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007, does not apply
because it was not in effect when Defendant was representing Mr. Sandberg. But Defendant fails to address the law that was in effect at the time. Moreover, Defendant
claims that operation of the Facility was an essential governmental activity, but Defendant ignores the facts and authority Mr. Sandberg cited to the contrary.
Accordingly, the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Sandberg's claims should
be reversed. The discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act
simply does not apply, as the City's acts and omissions have nothing to do with matters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

of governmental policy and did not involve anyone acting in a policymaking role. And
even if the discretionary function exception did apply, Laney makes clear that because
the City was not engaged in an essential governmental activity in designing, building,
or operating the Facility, granting the City immunity from its negligence would violate
article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.

Finally, Defendant's unsupported

argument that it is shielded from liability because the City was not liable for Mr.
Sandberg's initial slip on the icy concrete is simply a red herring.
ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Sandbergfs claims against the City
would have been barred by the discretionary function exception of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
1.

The Act's discretionary function exception would not have applied
to Mr. Sandberg's claim against Salt Lake City.
a.

The City would not have been able to escape liability
for its operation of a dangerous facility simply because the danger resulted from the initial design.

For Defendant to prevail on its "discretionary function" defense, Defendant must
establish, beyond any factual dispute, that the City's operation of the Facility in a
dangerously unsafe condition was "essential" to the realization or accomplishment of a
"basic governmental policy, program, or objective." See, e.g., Keegan v. State, 896
P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995). Discretionary function immunity applies only when the
government is engaged in a "basic policy-making function." Nelson v. Salt Lake City,
919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court has explained that discretionary function immunity is intended to protect decisions "impacting on large num-
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bers of people in a myriad of unforeseen ways," so that "public administration" is not
hamstrung by the "continual threat" of "individual and class legal actions." Keegan,
896P.2dat623.
Defendant has obviously failed to meet this burden, because Defendant does not
even attempt to show that the narrow sidewalk and the absence of a safety restraint
were "essential" to accomplishing the stated goal of "disposition of public waste in a
safe, environmentally sensitive manner that is convenient for citizens." (Appellee's Br.
at 17.) Further, Defendant has not disputed that, in fact, the Facility has been using
wider sidewalks and safety restraints since 1996, and there is no evidence that the
Facility has failed to accomplish its purposes since then.
Instead, Defendant claims that it was "the design of the waste facility" that was
essential to the realization of a basic governmental policy. In assessing Defendant's
design-level argument, however, three things immediately become apparent.

First,

Defendant has cited no authority suggesting that a governmental entity may escape
liability for a dangerous condition merely by claiming that the condition was part of a
project design. Instead, Utah courts hold that in applying the discretionary function
exception, a court must focus on the particular acts or omissions giving rise to the
plaintiff's claim. See Laney, 2002 UT 79, 1 17, 57 P.3d 1007 ("[T]he discretionary
function analysis . . . depends on which specific act, omission, or decision is being
challenged . . . ."); Truiillo v. UDOT. 1999 UT App 227, 1 29, 986 P.2d 752
(addressing each claimed negligent act separately). Thus, governmental entities in Utah
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have been held liable for negligent actions or decisions that were made as part of a
project design or plan. See Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Trujillo.
Second, Defendant provides no reason why its argument should prevail. And, in
fact, there is no reason why "design negligence" should be treated any differently than
any other negligence.

Neither the discretionary function exception itself nor the

policies behind the exception would support giving blanket immunity to all decisions
that happen to be made in the course of designing a project.
Third, even if this Court were to agree with Defendant's tautological argument
that "the design of the Waste Facility involved basic governmental policy making . . .
[and] was also essential to the accomplishment of the governmental purpose of designing and constructing a landfill" (Appellee's Br. at 17), summary judgment still
would not be proper, because the City was guilty of more than mere negligent design.
Mr. Sandberg was hurt because the Facility was unreasonably dangerous on March 25,
1996.

The unreasonably dangerous conditions, i.e., the narrow sidewalk and un-

guarded pit, resulted both from the original design and from the City's failure to
implement easy and obvious safety improvements in the five years the Facility was
open before the accident (even though a dozen people had been injured falling into the
pit during that time). (See R. 929.) Thus, even if the City were somehow shielded
from liability for defects inherent in the original design, Mr. Sandberg still would have
had a viable claim against the City for his injuries.
Defendant has not established as a matter of law that the City's decisions to build
the Facility with a dangerously narrow sidewalk and unguarded pit or to keep the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Facility in such a dangerous condition are protected by the discretionary function
exception. This alone is enough to require that the judgment below be reversed.
b.

The matters at issue did not involve the consideration
of broad policy factors.

Discretionary function immunity is also improper because any decisions involved
in the City's building and maintaining the Facility with a dangerously narrow sidewalk
and unguarded pit have absolutely nothing to do with governmental policy matters.
Rather, decisions such as how wide a sidewalk should be or whether to install a chain
are simply the routine, operational matters that business owners like the City make all
the time.

Indeed, Bud Stanford, who runs the Facility, even characterized these

matters as "minute to minute details." (Stanford Depo., R. 936.)
Accordingly, the Court can easily dismiss Defendant's suggestion that every
decision "related to the design and safety objectives of a governmental project" is a discretionary function under the Act. (Appellee Br. at 19.) In fact, Utah courts have repeatedly held that safety-related decisions made and actions taken during the design or
operation of a governmental project are not covered by the discretionary function exception. For example, in Carroll v. Road Commission. 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that the discretionary function exception did not
immunize the State from liability for injuries resulting from a road supervisor's
decision to use berms instead of signs to warn travelers that a road had been cut. The
court explained that the decision of how much protection to give travelers was not a
"basic policy decision":

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the instant action, the decision of the road supervisor to use
berms as the sole means of protection for the unwary traveler was not a
basic policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of
some basic governmental policy, program, or objective. His decision did
not require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise on the part of the Road Commission, His determination may
properly be characterized as one at the operational level of decision
making.
Id, 496 P.2d at 891-92 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the City's and the State's
decision to ignore a dangerous condition, i.e., a breach in a fence along the Jordan
River along a public park, was not a discretionary function. See Nelson. 919 P.2d at
575-76. In Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah
1983), the court held that the State's failure to adequately supervise a child's placement
in foster care was not protected by the discretionary function exception.

And as

addressed at length in Mr. Sandberg's opening brief, this Court held in Trujillo that
UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers to separate opposing
traffic was not a discretionary function.1 See Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227, If 29-33,
986P.2d752.

1

Defendant states that Trujillo "dealt with the operational decision of where to
place hollow plastic barrels directing traffic." (Appellee's Br. at 19.) Defendant made
largely the same assertion in its reply memorandum below (R. 1015) and at oral argument (Hearing Tr., R. 1083 at 11:10-12). Defendant's representation is utterly false:
The issue the Court focused on in Trujillo was whether UDOT was negligent in
choosing to use barrels, not whether the barrels themselves were properly spaced. See
Trujillo at 1" 29. Defendant's grossly misleading characterization of governing
precedent is troubling. Indeed, such a mischaracterization is particularly dangerous in
the present case, as the trial court admitted during the oral argument below that it
"didn't read the cases" (Hearing Tr., R. 1083 at 5:19-20), even though Mr. Sandberg
repeatedly cited Trujillo and even provided a copy along with his opposition memo-6-
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Carroll. Nelson. Little, and Trujillo all involved safety-related decisions pertaining to government activities. Yet, in each case, the court expressly rejected the
discretionary function defense. Thus, there is no basis for Defendant's contention that
safety-related decisions are automatically considered discretionary functions.
Further, immunizing all safety-related decisions from liability would expand the
discretionary function exception beyond all rational limits, because every negligence
claim involves a defendant's safety-related decision. The very definition of negligence
is "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm." Restatement (2d) of Torts § 282 (1965).
Thus, to prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
actions posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. But if the decision to act is
automatically considered a discretionary function because it touches on "safety," then
the discretionary function would be exactly as broad as the Governmental Immunity Act
itself and would allow the exception to completely negate the Act's waiver of
immunity. To adopt such a rule would be absurd.

CL Nelson. 919 P.2d at 575

("[Discretionary immunity clearly was not designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of
sovereign immunity in modern garb.").
The only support for Defendant's position is a portion of the lead opinion in
Lanev v. Fairview City. 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007. (See Appellee Br. at 19.) Lanev.
however, is distinguishable. In Lanev. the plaintiff's husband was killed when a thirty-

randum. (See R. 994-1007.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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foot-long irrigation pipe he was carrying contacted a power line that was more than
twenty-eight feet overhead. IcL 11 2, 24. The height of the power lines far exceeded
the applicable industry safety standards, which required only eighteen feet of ground
clearance. Id 1 24. Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged that the city was negligent in
choosing not to improve the power lines or to provide warning signs. Id 1 17. The
court held that the city would not have the discretion to build power lines that violated
industry safety standards, but that the city's decision not to use its limited funds to
improve the lines that already complied with those standards was protected by the
discretionary function exception.2 Laney at 11 25-26.
Laney is distinguishable from the present case because the improvements that the
plaintiff claimed should have been made would have involved a significant expense on
the part of the city and thus implicated the city's ability to allocate its limited funds
among all of its responsibilities. In fact, evidence in the record indicated that insulating
or raising the power lines in the city would have cost more than $700,000, which was
approximately 128% of the city's total budget for the year the accident took place.
Laney v. Fairview City, Brief of Appellee, at 3-4. Thus, the court stressed that its holding in Laney was "consistent with cases that have generally held that decisions bal-

2

Everything in this portion of the opinion in Laney is dicta, as it was unnecessary to the ultimate result. As discussed in more detail below, Laney held that the
plaintiff's claim was not barred by the Act because applying the Act to bar the claim
would violate the Open Courts provision. Therefore, whether Fairview City's acts fell
within the discretionary function exception had no bearing on the outcome: the result
would be the same whether the court found the exception to be inapplicable or to be
applicable but unconstitutional.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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ancing the need for safety improvements against limited governmental funding are
entitled to discretionary function immunity." Lanev at 1 23.3
In the present case, Defendant submitted no evidence that the Facility's dangerous condition arose from the City's balancing the "need for safety improvements"
against "limited governmental funding." C£ Lanev. 2002 UT 79, 1 23. Indeed, Defendant cites no evidence that cost considerations entered into any of the City's decisions
regarding the Facility. Instead, one must conclude that making the improvements at
issue (widening the sidewalk and installing a chain) did not have any significant fiscal
or social impact, because those improvements were made after Mr. Sandberg's accident, and no Council approval was required. (See Stanford Depo., R. 937, 941, 95152.) As there was no significant impediment to making the necessary safety improvements after Mr. Sandberg was injured, it would be highly difficult for Defendant to
establish that there were significant impediments to making those improvements before
he was injured.4

3

Laney itself relied on Utah's three significant "upgrade" cases to support its
holding: (1) Keeean v. State. 896 P.2d 618, 624-26 (Utah 1995) (discretionary
function exception protected decision not to raise height of barrier in Parley's Canyon,
where improvement would have resulted in "delays and inconvenience to users of the
highway if the barrier were to be dug up and replaced"); (2) Duncan v. Union Pac. R.
Co.. 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (UDOT immune from liability for failing to
upgrade railroad crossing where UDOT had an upgrade program in place and other
crossings had been given priority); and (3) Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R,, 749 P.2d 660, 667-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (same).
4
There are also significant questions about whether Laney could even apply to
the present case (even if it were not dicta), given that Laney was decided six years after
Mr. Sandberg's injury. This issue is addressed in more detail below.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

The discretionary function exception is intended to facilitate governing. Accordingly, where a decision requires a major allocations of limited resources or poses other
significant burdens on the citizens, that decision is entitled to immunity. But the decisions at issue in the present case have nothing to do with governing; they are merely
matters of customer convenience, just like countless decisions made every day by
product manufacturers, service providers, and other businesses. Immunizing the City
from the consequences of its own negligence in operating a waste disposal business
would not further the purposes behind the discretionary function exception. The discretionary function exception thus should not have barred Mr. Sandberg's claim against
the City.
c.

The decisions at issue were not made by anyone
acting in a policymaking position.

Defendant goes to great lengths to detail the "numerous steps" that the County
and City undertook in building the Facility. However, Defendant utterly fails to point
to any evidence showing that the particular safety aspects of the pit were ever considered or addressed by anyone in a policymaking position.

Nor does Defendant

present any reason as to why Trujillo does not control this aspect of the case.
Defendant notes that reports were commissioned from three independent
consultants, but these reports do not discuss how wide the Facility's sidewalks would
be, whether the pit would be unguarded, or what other safety features might be
provided. (See R. 172-92 (Chem Northern report); R. 211-206 (Montgomery report);
R. 308-578 (Brown, Vence & Associates report).) Defendant refers to City Engineer-

-10-
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ing's Scope of Work report, but that does not address the safety aspects of the open pit
either.5 (See R. 586-93.) Defendant further claims that EMCON, another consultant,
"reviewed the plans" (Appellee Br. at 21), but EMCON was asked to address only
"traffic patterns and necessary safety features for vehicles entering, unloading, and then
leaving the transfer station area" and was specifically not conducting a "detailed design
review."

(R. 772.) Finally, Defendant asserts that plans for the Facility were sent to

various public and private entities, but once again, Defendant cannot point to any instance in which the safety features of the unguarded pit were actually discussed.6
Probably the most significant document concerning the design of the Facility is
Mr. Jara's Design Report. Defendant claims that the Design Report sets forth "all" of
Mr. Jara's conclusions. (Appellee Br. at 21.) Yet Defendant cannot point to a single

5

Defendant claims that the diagram shows a "pit without barriers or chains"
(Appellee Br. at 21), but the diagram to which Defendant refers indicates that there
would be a wall along both edges of the unguarded pit. (See Diagram, R. 643, Exhibit
3 to Mr. Sandberg's opening brief.) At any rate, the interpretation of the diagram
would be a question of fact, which must be resolved in Mr. Sandberg's favor.
6
The Court should take great caution in assessing Defendant's statement that
"Bud Stanford has testified that the Public Works Department and the Council
considered the installation of barriers such as chains and poles during the design of the
Waste Facility, but decided against such measures because they created a hazard to
citizens unloading debris." (Appellee Br. at 25.) While Mr. Stanford did sign an
affidavit (which Defendant prepared) to that effect, Mr. Stanford later corrected his
testimony, explaining that (1) he could not recall safety chains being discussed at
review meetings with the Public Works Department or the Council, (2) neither the
Public Works Department nor the Council formally asked about safety features around
the pit, and (3) no decision was made by the Public Works Department or the Council
not to install such protective features. Instead, Mr. Stanford could remember only one
instance where safety barriers were discussed with a Council member, and that was an
informal conversation in the lunchroom after a meeting. (See Stanford Depo., R. 936,
938-40, 953.) Because Mr. Sandberg was the nonmoving party below, any factual
dispute concerning what the Council discussed must be resolved in his favor.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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place in the Design Report in which the safety aspects of the open pit are discussed.
(See R. 632-768.) The absence in the Design Report of any discussion of the matters at
issue suggests that, in fact, Mr. Jara did not spend much thought on those matters.
This case is no different from Trujillo. in which the plans for the highway
reconstruction project were considered in several meetings and reviewed by officials of
several governmental bodies, but there was no evidence that the particular decision that
led to the plaintiffs' injuries - the choice to use barrels for traffic separation — was
ever "specifically singled out for discussion, review, or approval." Trujillo. 1999 UT
App 227, 1 5, 986 P.2d 752. Indeed, just as in Trujillo. Defendant's evidence "does
no more than establish that [the matters at issue] could have been discussed" by someone in a policymaking position. Cf idL t 31 (emphasis in original).

Defendant's

discretionary function argument is actually much weaker in the present case than in
Trujillo: The cost and burdens of installing a heavy concrete barrier along ten miles of
highway are much greater than the costs and burdens of installing a few hundred yards
of chain, and thus more likely to involve resource allocation decisions, and the decision
in Trujillo was made in part by UDOT's Region One Design Engineer, while no one in
a comparable position participated in the decisions regarding the Facility. The discretionary function exception was held not to apply in Trujillo, and under the doctrine
of stare decisis, the same result is required here.

-12-
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2.

As Lanev confirms, applying the Act to bar Mr. Sandberg's claim
against Salt Lake City would have violated the Open Courts
provision.
a.

Because operation of the Landfill is not a core or
essential governmental activity, Mr. Sandberg is
entitled to a remedy for his injuries.

In Lanev, issued on August 9, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
legislature's 1987 expansion of the Governmental Immunity Act is subject to the Open
Courts provision of the Utah Constitution, and that applying the Act to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death claim arising out of the operation of a municipal power system
would be unconstitutional. Lanev v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007. As
explained above, the plaintiff in Lanev was the widow of a man who was electrocuted
when his irrigation pipe touched a city-owned overhead power line. The court held that
as a matter of statutory interpretation, the discretionary function exception of the Act
would bar her claim, but that such an application of the Act would be subject to the
Open Courts analysis adopted in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985). See Lanev 11 27-48 (lead opinion by Durham, C.J., joined by Howe, J.),
11 74-83 (concurring opinion by Russon, J.). Applying Berry, the court further held
that abrogating a claim for a wrongful death arising out of the operation of a municipal
power system violated article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. IdL 11 54-71,
182.
Lanev confirms two arguments Mr. Sandberg made in his opening brief. First,
Lanev confirms that article I, section 11, as applied and interpreted by Berry, restricts
the legislature's ability to immunize governmental entities from liability for their own
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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negligence, and that if the Act abrogates an existing remedy, the abrogation is unconstitutional unless a reasonable alternative remedy is provided or the abrogation is justified by the need to fight a social or economic evil. See icL 1f 27-48, f f 78-79.
Second, Lanev confirms that governmental immunity abrogates an existing remedy and
triggers the Berry analysis if the immunized activity was not "of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency" or "essential to the core of
governmental activity." Id ff 51-53 (quoting Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980)); Iff 81-82.

Lanev further supports Mr. Sandberg's con-

stitutional argument in holding that operation of a public power system is not a core or
essential governmental function because such public utilities have traditionally been
considered proprietary and subject to tort liability. Id. 11153, 81.
Lanev requires that Mr. Sandberg's claim be restored. As in Lanev, applying
the Actfs discretionary function exception to bar Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City
would have violated article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, for there can be no
doubt that operation of a solid waste disposal facility is not "essential to the core of
governmental activity." Solid waste disposal facilities can be and commonly are operated by private entities (R. 943-44, 962-63, 982, 988), and Utah law expressly allows
private operation of such facilities. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3)(a). Indeed, Utah
law authorizes, but does not require, public entities to provide such facilities to its
citizens. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-503. And the Landfill is not supported by tax revenues but is instead wholly funded by fees charged to the Landfill's customers. (R.
945-47.) Moreover, disposal of municipal sewage is not a core governmental function
-14-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under the Standiford test, and disposal of solid waste is certainly no more an essential
governmental activity than disposal of sewage. See Thomas v. Clearfield, 642 P.2d
737, 739 (Utah 1982); Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist.. 676 P.2d 399, 400
(Utah 1984).
Defendant, however, claims that the "traditional" municipal activity of "protecting public health and the environment by providing for safe waste disposal" is a
core governmental activity under the Standiford test, so that abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's claim does not implicate the Open Courts provision. (Appellee Br. at 26-27.)
Not surprisingly, Defendant offers no evidence or authority suggesting that providing
waste disposal is a core governmental activity. Indeed, Thomas and Dalton establish
that waste disposal is not a core governmental activity.7 Further, operation of a public
hospital is clearly important to maintaining the "public health," but even operation of a
public hospital is not a core governmental function entitled to immunity. See Greenhalgh v. Pavson Citv. 530 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah 1975).
In addition to hospitals and waste disposal systems, a number of other "traditional" municipal services are proprietary activities for the purposes of governmental
immunity: operation of an electrical power system, Laney, 2002 UT 79, if 53; maintenance of a water storage tank, Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev't Corp., 797 P.2d 419,
422 (Utah 1990); financing, design, and construction of an irrigation system, Richards

7

Reliable disposal of sewage is far more critical to the public health and the
environment than disposal of yard waste, old washing machines, construction debris,
and similar sorts of waste that are disposed of at the Facility.
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Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); construction and management of waterworks, Egelhoff v. Ogden City. 71 Utah 511, 267 P. 1011 (1928); supplying water, gas, and light, Lanev at 1 53 (dicta). The solid waste disposal services
provided by the Landfill are analogous. As with the Landfill, municipalities traditionally charge fees when providing these services. And even though these services make
life for a municipality's citizens safer and more convenient, municipalities have
traditionally been held liable for their negligence in providing these services. There is
no reason to think that providing a place to dump household trash is any more uniquely
governmental than any of the services discussed in these cases.
Notably, the trial court expressly recognized that operation of the Landfill was
not a core governmental function. (See, e.g.. Hearing Tr. at 62, Addendum Exhibit 6
hereto ("I would also say, for whatever it matters, it is my ruling that if the '87
amendment didn't pass constitutional muster, as they say, that landfills are not accorded
governmental function. That to me is fairly clear.").) The trial court rejected Mr.
Sandberg's constitutional argument only because the court mistakenly believed that it
lacked the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional. (See kL at 63:13-15 ("It's not
my job as a trial judge, in very many instances that I can recall, to say it's constitutional or not.").) Lanev, however, has now clarified that the 1987 amendment to
the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to eliminate liability for injuries arising
from non-essential or non-core activities.

Thus, because applying the Act to Mr.
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Sandberg's claim would be unconstitutional, summary judgment based on the Act's
discretionary function exception is clearly improper.8
b.

Laney controls even though it had not been decided
when Defendant represented Mr. Sandberg.

Recognizing that Laney requires reversal, Defendant attempts to avoid Laney
because it was not decided until recently. Defendant's argument lacks merit, however.
First, Defendant misreads the governing authority when it states that the law in
effect at the time of the negligence "governs" a malpractice case. Defendant relies on
Hipwell v. Sharp and Legal Malpractice, but neither of those authorities applies to the
present case. Instead, Hipwell and Legal Malpractice addressed what law controls the
question of whether an attorney acted negligently, not whether that negligence proximately caused harm. See Hipwell v. Sharp. 858 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1993) (emphasis
added) ("[A]n evaluation of the reasonableness of an attorney's services" must be based
on the law in effect at the time.); 3 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice. § 19.10 (5th
ed. 2000) (discussing "errors of law" and explaining that "the standard of care is not
established by hindsight.").
Whether Defendant acted negligently, however, is not presently at issue; in fact,
Defendant's negligence in failing to learn that the City designed, co-owned, and co-

Mr. Sandberg also contends that the abrogation of his right to recover for his
injuries is unconstitutional under the Berry analysis because the Act provides no
effective or alternative remedy and the abrogation is not justified by the need to fight a
social or economic evil. Defendant has not disputed the application of the Berry test to
the present case.
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operated the Facility is established for purposes of this appeal.9 Rather, Defendant's
summary judgment motion was based solely on its claim that its negligence did not
proximately cause Mr. Sandberg any harm because he had no valid claim against the
City. (See Mem. in Support of [Def.'s] Mot. for Summ. J., R. 143.) Thus, the
. authority Defendant cites has no bearing on whether or how Laney governs this case.10
Second, due to the nature of the proximate cause inquiry, Laney compels reversal of the trial court even though Lanev had not been decided when Defendant represented Mr. Sandberg. In assessing whether an attorney's negligence proximately
caused the victim any harm, an objective standard is used: "The objective is to establish what the result [of the underlying litigation] should have been . . . . ' " Harline v.
Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 439-40 (Utah 1996) (quoting 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice. § 27.7 (3d ed. 1989) (bracketed material and emphasis in original).) Thus,
for the summary judgment to stand, this Court must conclude that even though Def-

9

Mr. Sandberg's complaint alleged that Defendant breached the duty of due care
by failing to discover the City's involvement with the Facility and in failing to timely
file a notice of claim against the City. (Complaint if 11, R. 3.) And because Defendant
presented no evidence below to controvert this allegation, the allegation is accepted as
true for purposes of Defendant's summary judgment motion. See Wilkinson v. Union
Pac. R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) (where no evidence presented to
controvert allegations of complaint, plaintiff may rely on those allegations).
10
If Defendant were contending that Mr. Jensen consciously chose not to bring a
claim against the City because governmental immunity would have barred the claim,
then perhaps the "law in effect" argument might have some relevance. However, such
a contention would be false. Defendant did not "choose" not to sue the City; instead,
the attorney on the case simply thought Salt Lake County was the sole owner and failed
to discover the City's involvement until it was too late. And the attorney clearly did
not believe that immunity applied, as he did pursue Mr. Sandberg's claim against the
County.
-18-
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endant negligently failed to discover and pursue Mr. Sandberg's claim against Salt Lake
City, no harm resulted because the law would have required the claim to be dismissed.
Whether Laney applies "retroactively" is ultimately irrelevant because even
under authorities that were in effect in 1996, applying the Act to bar Mr. Sandberg's
claim against the City would have been unconstitutional.

Had Defendant properly

brought Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City, and had the City sought summary judgment under the discretionary function exception (which is highly doubtful), the court in
which the claim was pending would have had to decide whether the dismissing Mr.
Sandberg's claim under the Act satisfied the Open Courts provision.11 To do so, the
hypothetical court would have had to answer three questions (among others): (1) whether an abrogation of remedies by the Governmental Immunity Act triggers the Berry
analysis; (2) whether the Standiford "essential function/core activity" test should be
used in determining whether the Act abrogates a remedy and thus triggers Berry; and
(3) whether the City's operation of the Facility is an essential or core activity under
Standiford. In answering those three questions, the court would have had to interpret
article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, plus Berry, Standiford. DeBrv v. Noble12,
and Thomas, all of which had been enacted or decided when Mr. Sandberg was hurt.

11

There can be no doubt that if the City raised a governmental immunity
defense, Defendant would have objected to the defense on constitutional grounds. In
fact, when Salt Lake County claimed that the Act's $250,000 damages cap limited Mr.
Sandberg's right to recover, Defendant actually filed a separate declaratory judgment
action seeking a ruling that the cap was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Sandberg's
claim. (Complaint, Sandberg v. Salt Lake County, Case 980904585, Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, filed May 6, 1998, Addendum Exhibit 7 hereto.)
12
889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
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Because that claim was never brought, however, this Court must now determine,
in this "case-within-the-case," how those questions should have been answered under
those authorities. But Laney tells us how those questions should have been answered.
Lanev states that under the Open Courts provision, applying the Governmental Immunity Act to abrogate a previously existing remedy is unconstitutional unless the abrogation satisfies Berry. Laney also tells us that governmental entities are generally liable
for injuries resulting from their negligence in non-core or non-essential activities, so
immunizing a governmental entity for such liability abrogates an existing remedy and
triggers Berry. Finally, in applying the foregoing legal principles, Laney tells us that
providing electrical power is not a core or essential governmental activity and that
abrogating a claim arising out of such an activity violates Berry and thus the Open
Courts provision. Lanev, 2002 UT 79, 11 49-53, 57 P.3d 1007.
Laney, of course, provides the "August 2002" answers to those questions, and
not the "1996" answers that this Court must provide. But under the doctrine of stare
decisis, Laney's answers control the present case. For example, as noted above, Laney
held that any abrogation of remedies by the Act must withstand Berry in order to pass
constitutional muster. For this Court to come to a different answer, the Court would
have to determine either that (a) the Utah Supreme Court erred in its conclusion that
Berry applies to an abrogation of remedies by the Act, or (b) the Utah Constitution
meant something different in 1996 than it did in August 2002 or does today. The
doctrine of stare decisis, however, prevents this Court from ruling that the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the Utah Constitution in Lanev was wrong. And there is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-20- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no principled basis upon which this Court could hold that the meaning of the Utah
Constitution has changed in the past six or seven years.
Thus, even though Laney had not been decided when Defendant represented Mr.
Sandberg, Lanev explains how the authority that was in effect, including the Utah
Constitution and the cases applying it, should have been applied to Mr. Sandbergfs
claim against the City: Any defense by the City under the discretionary function
exception should have failed because applying that exception to bar Mr. Sandberg's
claim would have violated Mr. Sandberg's right to a remedy for his injuries under
article I, section 11. Accordingly, Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would not
have been barred.13
B.

Defendant cannot avoid liability for its malpractice by claiming that the City
had no duty to remove the ice and snow from the unguarded edge of the
open pit.
1.

The City had a duty to exercise due care to maintain the Facility in
a reasonably safe condition, and the City breached this duty by
failing remove snow and ice from the edge of the pit.

A city is charged with the duty of maintaining public areas in reasonably safe
condition according to the area's usual mode of use. See, e.g., Braithwaite v. West
Valley Citv. 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake Citv v. Schubach. 159 P.2d
149, 151-152 (Utah 1945). Further, in operating a business, the City is subject to the

13

Had Laney had actually announced a change in the law, then perhaps
Defendant could argue that the Utah Constitution would have been interpreted differently in 1996 than it was in August 2002. But Laney did not overrule any preexisting Utah case law; instead, Lanev confirmed what earlier Utah cases -- Berry.
Standiford. and DeBry - had already established.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

same duty of reasonable care as private entities,14 and a business owner has a duty to
use reasonable care to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe
condition for its patrons. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah
1996). Thus, the City had a duty to maintain in a safe condition the unloading site
where Mr. Sandberg fell.
Defendant, however, asserts that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would
have failed because the City supposedly had no duty to "mop the sidewalk dry" under
Martin v. Safeway Stores. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Thus, Defendant argues,
the City would not be liable for Mr. Sandberg's fall even if it knew about the slippery
condition of the walkway and chose not to do anything about it.

Defendant is

completely wrong.
Martin confirms the basic rule that a business owner is liable for a slip-and-fall
when "the condition complained of has existed for a long enough time that the owner
should have known about it and corrected it, or has had actual knowledge of the
condition complained of." Id. at 1140. In Martin, however, the court upheld a directed verdict entered at the close of the evidence because the evidence showed that the
defendant had not been negligent under that standard: the plaintiff had not presented
evidence that the danger existed long enough for the defendant to discover it, and when
the defendant's clerk inspected the area, the area was not icy. Id Martin is inapplic-

<

14

See, e.g.. Lanev. 2002 UT 79, f 77, 57 P.3d 1007 (Russon, J., concurring)
("It has been long established that government, when performing proprietary functions,
is liable for its actions."); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Tort Liability § 107 (2d ed.
2001).
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able because Defendant has presented no evidence that the City was not negligent in
failing to remove the snow and ice. Moreover, Mr. Sandberg's claim is not based on a
"failure to mop the sidewalk dry," but on the City's failure to remove ice or snow from
a highly dangerous spot. And Martin did not hold that a landowner had no duty to
remove ice or snow, particularly along the unguarded edge of a dropoff.
Applying the standard from Martin, the evidence shows that the City's
employees should have, in the exercise of ordinary care, known that the concrete unloading area on the edge of a pit could be icy, slippery, and dangerous on the day after
a snowfall when temperatures were freezing. See Martin, 565 P.2d at 1140. Because
Mr. Sandberg's accident happened at 11:00 a.m. (R. 842.), there was plenty of time to
inspect the area and make it safe. At the very least, genuine issues of fact exist. Thus,
it would be error for this Court to hold as a matter of law that the City did not act
negligently in failing to remove the ice or snow to protect the users of the Facility.
2.

Even if the City was not responsible for causing Mr. Sandberg to
lose his balance, the City still was liable for the injuries Mr.
Sandberg suffered by falling into the open concrete pit.

Moreover, Defendant's argument that the City had no duty to remove ice and
snow is a red herring, because even if the City was not liable for the icy condition of
the walkway, the City clearly was liable for injuries resulting from Mr. Sandberg's fall
into the open pit. Defendant apparently asserts that if the City's negligence did not
cause Mr. Sandberg's initial loss of balance, then the City could not be liable for Mr.
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Sandberg's injuries, but, not surprisingly, Defendant has not adduced any authority,
evidence, or reasoning to support such a novel proposition.15
To establish that the City's negligent failure to prevent falls into the open pit
proximately caused Mr. Sandberg's injuries, Mr. Sandberg need only show that the
City's negligence "was a substantial causative factor leading to his injury." McCorvev
v. UDOT. 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993). Obviously, an injury may have more than
one proximate cause. Id, Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury.
IcL And, once again, if Defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that the
City's negligence did not proximately cause Mr. Sandberg's injuries, Defendant would
have to support its position with evidence and argument. See Wilkinson v. Union Pac.
R^Ca, 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998).
Defendant has not. In fact, there is no evidence that the City's negligent design,
construction, and operation did not proximately cause Mr. Sandberg's injuries.
Instead, the evidence in the record creates at least a reasonable inference that the
narrow sidewalk along the edge of the pit, coupled with the absence of a chain or other
restraint, caused Mr. Sandberg to free-fall five feet onto hard concrete, landing on his
feet and then his head. (R. 845-49.) Even if the City were not responsible for Mr.
Sandberg's initial slip, the City's negligence in designing, building, and operating the
Facility turned that minor stumble into a catastrophe that resulted in shattered bones,

15

Defendant presents no argument or explanation in support of its unstated
assertion that the City would not have been liable for Mr. Sandberg's injuries if it were
not liable for his initial loss of balance. Thus, the Court should decline to address
Defendant's argument on this point. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
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cartilage damage, amputated toes, and multiple surgeries.

Thus, there is clearly

evidence that the City's negligence substantially contributed to these injuries, and it
would improper for this Court to hold that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would
have been dismissed as a matter of law.16
CONCLUSION
Mr. Sandberg respectfully requests that the Court vacate the summary judgment
entered below and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED:

December 11 , 2002.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

4^ '*'

Francis J. Carney
Stephen P. Horvat
Attorneys for Albert Sandberg

16

Defendant's statement that "Sandberg claims that his fall was caused by the
wet and slippery sidewalk" is misleading. (Appellee Br. at 30.) Mr. Sandberg's
personal injury claim against the City would not have been for his "fall," but rather for
the injuries he suffered when he hit the concrete. And Mr. Sandberg has never claimed
that the icy sidewalk was the sole cause of those injuries. Instead, Mr. Sandberg has
always maintained that the narrow sidewalk and absence of safety restraint caused him
to go into the pit. (See, e.g., R. 847 (If a barrier had been in place, "I'd have never
went over. . . . [f] I probably would have still slipped, and I probably would have
been laying up against something if there would have been something there.").
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6.

Transcript of Hearing, January 10, 2002 (portions), R. 1083.

7.

Complaint, Sandberg v. Salt Lake County, Case 980904585, Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, filed May 6, 1998.
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the constitutionality of that statute in his briefing.
already filed two briefs in this.

He's

We found a whole other brief

in this case.
THE COURT:
MS. ROMERO:

Right.
Then I think what we're here today on

was what's going to be before the appellate court, which is the
record today.

The record before your Honor —

THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MS. ROMERO:

- can handle the whole thing.

MR. CARNEY:

I'm aware where this minor part of our

brief comes from.

It's five pages of our brief.

THE COURT:

I guess to me, as I was reading it, I

wasn't —
MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:

Five pages of our brief, not a footnote, j
Where do you -

MR. CARNEY:

Page 23 through -

THE COURT:

Let me go to yours.

MR. CARNEY:

- 2 6, four pages.

THE COURT:
that's the Standiford
MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:

23 to 26.

Let me get there.

Well,

thing, but —
Right.
See, you're — maybe I just read this

wrong, but when I read your reply to her memo in support, I got
the distinct sense you were standing on the
standard.

Standiford

Then she comes back in her response to your reply —
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1

I don't know if I'm using the right words — but —

2

MR. CARNEY: Yeah.

3

THE COURT: - her second salvo says, Nice talk, but

4

it doesn't matter because in *87 the legislature redid

5

Standiford.

6

I agree that you talk about - let me just read here to your

7

footnote.

8

essential core governmental activity test was formulated, the

9

Supreme Court was interpreting the Governmental Immunity Act as I

That's not the rule in Utah; here it is.

So, no,

If you'll go to page 24, footnote 5 says, "When the

10

it existed at the time, not the Utah Constitution."

11

I think Standiford

12

what does the Immunity Act —

was not a constitutional problem.

That's why!
It was

13

MR. CARNEY: Right.

14

THE COURT: - mean.

15

MR. CARNEY: And it's DeBry that says that the

16

Standiford

was also the starting point for the constitutional

17 i analysis.
18
19

THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

And I can't or didn't - I'm

not familiar with DeBry and didn't look at it.

20

MR. CARNEY: And then we go -

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24

you're saying.

Your saying — let me just see here what

DeBry — okay.

Well, if either of you have more to say, I mean I
understand your points.

I don't know that I feel comfortable

25 I one way or the other, but my urge is to decide so that it can
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move on, but I —

•

MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:
decision.

Okay.
- don't want it to be considered in the

That's the problem.

Do you want to say more,

Mr. Carney, on whether or not I need to —
MR. CARNEY:

Well, yeah.

I mean Mr. Horvat does not

brief it as well as it could have been briefed, but on page 26
he talks about Berry
unconstitutional.

v.

Beech

Aircraft

and why it's

I mean —

THE COURT:

How about if I came down this way and

said, you know — this just sounds to me the right path.

Now,

as the judge, I've got to uphold the law as it's now written.
So I would have to say on a constitutional issue that the
amendment is fine.

x

87

But I would also say, for whatever it

matters, it would be my ruling that if the

A

87 amendment didn't

pass constitutional muster, as they say, that landfills are not
accorded governmental function.
MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

That to me is fairly clear.

But, you know -

So I guess what I'm saying is, if you

prevail on beating down the ^87 amendment, you'd have a ruling
that says it's not accorded governmental function, therefore
there is no immunity, if you go back to Standiford

as kind of

the analysis, and therefore this exercise of discretion, if you
went on that, doesn't apply, so they can come out then.
MR. CARNEY:

I mean Mr. Sandberg is in pretty tight
i
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financial circumstances —
THE COURT:

Well, no, I don't know what I can do

about that.
MR. CARNEY:

Well, my point is, this can be an

interesting exercise for us, but if you look at it the other
way, and that is, if you take the time to read Standiford
read DeBry and read Berry v. Beech,

and

I think you will find it

unconstitutional, and then we will have a trial in April.
THE COURT:

No.

I think - let me tell you how it all

is probably going to come out.

I'm going to follow by in large

the — it seems to me that this thread runs through all these
decisions, that the judge has a duty to uphold the law as the
constitution.

It's not my job as a trial judge, in very many

instances that I can recall, to say it's constitutional or not.
I can presume the constitutionality, I think.
MR. CARNEY:

I don't think that's the law, and I've

seen lots of trial judges find statutes unconstitutional.
happens all the time.

It

For example, the medical malpractice cap

has been held twice unconstitutional by a —
THE COURT:
MR. CARNEY:

By a trial judge?
- trial judge.

Yeah.

Roger

Livingston — as Judge Livingston recently said somewhat along
your lines, I'll let the Supreme Court decide it.

But in fact

two other judges prior to that have said, No, this is
unconstitutional, and I'm not going to just leave it to the
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Supreme Court.

I have to make a decision.

That's why I'm a

judge, and I need to decide it.
THE COURT:
candor.

I thought was the exact opposite, in all

Maybe I just took the easy way.

I've heard what I

wanted to hear.
MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:

I really don't think that's Well, if you don't want me to do it that

way, I would probably need briefing from you both.
MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:

I'm going to oppose that, and —
Well, that's good, but I'm probably going

to go ahead and do it.
MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:
MS. ROMERO:

Okay.
No.

For the record, you're opposing it.

No, I am going to oppose it because he

brought this lawsuit and we brought our motion on the law
existing today, and the fact of the matter is the Utah Supreme
Court in Ledfers

v. Emery

County

School

District

and the Tenth

Circuit said that the 1987 amendment leaves no doubt that our
pre-1987 cases were the target of this amendment and that the
law has changed, and cites
THE COURT:

Standiford.

Well, I wouldn't argue that's what they

say, but I mean one doesn't know without analyzing those cases
whether somebody raised a constitutional cause.
MS. ROMERO:

Well, I guess - you know, I don't think

that you - I think that as - I have to agree with you, your
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Honor —
THE COURT:

Well, of course you do because I'm in the

camp.
MS. ROMERO:

I would agree with you anyway.

I don't

think you were — I think that you can go based on the laws that
exist today, and he can appeal it.
THE COURT:

And if he wants to —

But your point, Mr. Carney, is you would

like me to come down on your side now so that we can have the
trial —
MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:
nine yards.

Of course he does.
- and then if there's an appeal, it's all

It's 110 yards —

MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:
MS. ROMERO:

Right.
- instead of the pretrial jousting.
Well, that's all good and well.

The

problem is, we've got — what happens if we go through the trial
and your Honor —
THE COURT:

Can I -

MS. ROMERO:

— makes a decision with discretionary?

THE COURT:

Well, I could come to the same decision.

If you —

MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:
put other people.

No legal inability So we've gone through a trial, and so we

You know, that's —

MS. ROMERO:

Put other people to inconvenience —
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THE COURT:

That's a tough valley.

MS. ROMERO:

— a lot of money.

been going for some time now.

I mean this case has

I think that, you know, this is

not — as I read their pleadings, I didn't read it to raise the
constitutionality of the —
THE COURT:
I'll do.

Let me go back.

I think this is what

I'm going to grant the motion for the summary

judgment on the part of the defendant on the basis that
Sandberg couldn't have prevailed against Salt Lake City.
Jensen's lawsuit wouldn't have gone anywhere because this would
have been a discretionary function and they would have retained
their immunity.

And that the statute passed in '87 which

overrode Standiford,

changed the rules, it's constitutional.

Because that's how I believe I'd come out, Mr. Carney.
MR. CARNEY:
THE COURT:
Standiford

Okay.
And if it matters, if it's a benefit, if

were in place, it was according to me in reviewing

that today that I would have concluded that a landfill was not
a core governmental function and it would not have been
included under this umbrella.
So I guess those first three parts.

Right.

It's

constitutional, the landfill is not a core government function,
but under the laws it is today.

This is a clear, in my mind,

exercise of a high-level policy discretionary function that
allows for the immunity to be retained.
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1 i

Ms. Romero, is there something more you need before

2 ! you draw me an order?
3
4
5
6

MS. ROMERO:

No.

I'll prepare an order and send it

to Mr. Carney.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything more that we need to

discuss right now?

7

MR. CARNEY:

I don't think so.

8

THE COURT:

9

(WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded at 3:29 p.m.)

Okay.

Thank you both.
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GORDON K. JENSEN - 4351
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
620 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-7858

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT SANDBERG
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

CIVIL NO ^0<ft)HSgS K £

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY

JUDGE: /fat

H{ . $kj+ba,

Defendant.

The plaintiff complains against the defendant as follows:
1.

This cause of action arose in Salt Lake County, Utah. Jurisdiction and venue are

proper in this Court.
2.

This is a claim for declaratory relief under Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 et seq. and

Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is based on the facts set forth below.
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3.

On March 25, 1996, the plaintiff went to the Salt Lake County Landfill Public

Refuse Unloading Facility located at 6030 West 1300 South, Salt Lake County, Utah ("County
Landfill") to unload waste materials.
4.

The County Landfill is owned, maintained, and operated by Salt Lake County

("County").
5.

The County charges a fee to individuals desiring to unload or "dump" waste

materials into the County Landfill
6.

The unloading area of the County Landfill is, essentially, a cement "canal". The

unloading "canal" appears approximately a couple of hundred yards long, about 20 yards wide
and about 5 to 6 feet deep.
7.

Regarding unloading waste material, the general practice is for individual to back

a vehicle up to the end of the cement curb to the side of the unloading "canal" and to unload
waste materials while standing on a cement area ("sidewalk") between the curb and the edge of
the unloading "canal". After the waste materials are unloaded, they are collected by bulldozers
and taken to other areas of the County Landfill.
8.

The unloading "canal" and the "sidewalk" area from the edge of the "canal" to the

curb, is composed entirely of concrete. There are no railings, ropes, chains, or barriers of any
kind to allow individuals at County Landfill to stabilize themselves as they unload waste
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materials or to prevent those patrons from falling into the unloading "canal" if, for any reason,
those patrons should misstep or lose their balance around the ledge of the unloading "canal".
9.

At the time of the plaintiffs injury, there were ununiform patches of yellow paint

around the ledge of the unloading "canal", which made that area slicker then the rest of the
concrete surface near the unloading "canal".
10.

On March 25, 1996, the plaintiff fell into the unloading "canal" while unloading

waste materials. In that fall, the plaintiff suffered the severe personal injuries, which are the
subject of a separate lawsuit filed in the Court, entitled Albert Sandberg v. Salt Lake County.
Civil No. 980900431 PI.
11.

Immediately after the plaintiffs fall, an agent/ employee of the County came to

the plaintiffs aid and told the plaintiff that he was the last of the number of individuals who had
fallen into the "canal". The employee explained that the canal was dangerous and that someone
should pursue a claim against the County because the County had been on notice of this
dangerous condition for some time.
12.

Some time after March 25, 1996, the County added poles and chains to the ledge

of the unloading "canal", which created a protective barrier around the "canal" allowing patrons
to stabilize themselves or prevent themselves from falling into the "canal". The County also
posted warning signs on every pole and widened the "sidewalk" area from the ledge of "canal" to
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the curb, widening the area upon which patrons could move around to unload any waste
materials.
13.

These precautionary measures were feasible before March 25, 1996.

14.

As a direct and proximate result of County's negligence, the plaintiff has suffered

severe personal injuries, including, but not limited to, severe lacerations of the head requiring
extensive suturing and glass removal; a complex tear of the medial meniscus, including the
presence of intra articular loose fragments; a tear of the under surface of the anterior horn of the
lateral meniscus; the disruption of the posterior cruciate ligaments; the shattering of many bones
in the plaintiffs foot, which has required multiple surgeries, including the placement of hardware
to keep the fracture repair intact; the amputation of portions of the plaintiffs toes; a permanent
limp; and severe low back, hip, knee, ankle, and foot pain.
15.

As a further direct and proximate cause of the County's negligence, the plaintiff

will sustain further medical expenses, including a total right knee replacement within two years
and a left ankle fusion to avoid left ankle movement and further deterioration of the left ankle.
16.

As a further direct and proximate result of the County's negligence, the plaintiff

has incurred medical expenses of approximately fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), and will
incur future medical expense of over twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
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17.

As a further direct and proximate result of the County's negligence the plaintiff

has suffered lost wages in an amount to be established at trial, but currently exceeds fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000.00).
18.

As a further direct and proximate result of the County's negligence, the plaintiff

has suffered general damages, including past and future physical and emotional pain and
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, permanent disfigurement, and permanent impairment in an
amount to be established at trial.
19.

This case is not a personal injury claim. The plaintiff, pursuant to Utah Code

Ann.§ 78-33-1 et seq. and Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that this Court
determine his rights under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34, which purports to limit his damages in
this case to $250,000.
20.

The plaintiff alleges that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 does not bar the plaintiff

from a recovery greater then $250,000 because that statute is inapplicable to the facts of this case
and/or unconstitutional, as supported by Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989), as will further be explained in subsequent motion and memoranda.
21.

The plaintiff requests a speedy hearing on this action for declaratory judgment and

requests that the Court advance this action on its calendar, as soon as appropriate motions and
memoranda have been submitted.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment as follows.
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1.

For a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 does not bar the plaintiff from

recovering in excess of $250,000 because that statute is inapplicable to these facts and/or is
unconstitutional, as will more fully be set forth in subsequent motion and memoranda.
2.

That a speedy hearing be set in this matter.

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems equitable.
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DATED this \D
lD day of^ptfi.
ofpp($A1998.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

We,

GORDON K. JENSEN
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff Resides at:
3089 Constitution Di\
West Valley City, UT. 84119
MAILING CERTI JCATE
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I hereby certify that on this IQ ' day of A^QL 1998, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Jay Stone
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, #S-3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
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